Operational resilience
Operational resilience is important for maintaining financial stability in the UK.
By 'operational resilience', we mean the ability of firms and the financial sector as a whole to absorb and adapt to shocks and disruptions, rather than contribute to them.
It extends beyond business continuity and disaster recovery. Financial firms and FMIs must have robust plans in place to deliver essential services, no matter the disruption. This includes man-made threats such as physical and cyberattacks, IT system outages and third-party supplier failure. It also includes natural hazards such as fire, flood, severe weather and pandemic.
As a central bank and regulator of financial firms and FMIs, we have an important part to play in improving the resilience of the sector.
How we set policy
Our Financial Policy Committee (FPC) looks at the resilience of the system as a whole. The committee sets out its priorities twice a year in its Financial Stability Report. The committee's macroprudential approach to operational resilience is set out in the Financial Stability in Focus.
Our Prudential Regulation Committee (PRC) and Financial Market Infrastructure Board (FMIB) focus on the operational resilience of the firms and FMIs we regulate.
Our approach
To support operational resilience we:
- supervise firms and FMIs
- engage with the sector and international authorities to drive collective action
We have set out our approach to operational resilience for firms in our policy statements. This work is carried out by the Bank of England and by our Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA).
In summary, we ask firms to:
- identify important business services – boards and senior management must identify and prioritise services that, if disrupted, would impact our objectives and the public interest;
- set impact tolerances – firms must say to what extent they would be able to continue important business services after severe but plausible disruptions; and
- ensure they can remain within impact tolerances – firms must map their important business services and test their capacity to continue them to the agreed extent; where firms identify vulnerabilities that might stop them from remaining within impact tolerances, these should be addressed.
We have set out our policy on operational resilience of FMIs.
Collective action
The Cross Market Operational Resilience Group (CMORG) leads sector-wide collective action on operational resilience.
The group is made up of about 25 members, firms across retail, wholesale, FMIs, insurance, the financial authorities and the National Cyber Security Centre. Its co-chairs are senior executives of the PRA and UK Finance.
CMORG has three core objectives:
- Identify risks to the resilience of the financial sector.
- Develop solutions to improve the operational resilience of the sector.
- Share knowledge.
Specialist subgroups support CMORG. They design, manage and deliver operational resilience improvements for the sector. The work of these groups is voluntary. Their chairs meet regularly to discuss CMORG's activities and identify areas for more collaboration.
A Project Management Office (PMO) also supports CMORG. It is jointly resourced by us and UK Finance. It is has developed a website to improve awareness of CMORG activity.
CMORG-endorsed capabilities (including good practice guidance, response frameworks and contingency tools) have been developed collectively by industry to support the operational resilience of the UK's financial sector. The financial authorities support the development of these capabilities and collective efforts to improve sector resilience. However, their use is optional and they do not constitute regulatory rules or supervisory expectations. As such, they may not necessarily represent formal endorsement by the authorities.
The Financial Services Cyber Collaboration Centre (FSCCC) is a CMORG-led partnership. It aims to help identify, investigate and co-ordinate the response to incidents that may have consequences for the financial sector. It analyses and distributes information to produce timely outputs for the sector's benefit.
What happens if there is a disruption in the financial sector?
Individual firms should contact their usual business or supervisory contacts at the Bank or the FCA.
The sector's response is facilitated by the Sector Response Framework (SRF). It sets out how organisations across the sector and government are connected. It also explains how they may respond to incidents individually and together when the impact becomes broader than a single firm or FMI and requires co-ordination, information-sharing or collective action.
Its purpose is to:
- allow firms, FMIs and the sector to make collective, timely, informed decisions in response to incidents
- provide a reference to good practice, contingency tools and plans, which may be invoked as part of a sector response
- include decision makers and subject matter experts
- be organised on a modular basis, so that components of the SRF can respond
- be recognised by the financial authorities as the principle structure by which the sector will respond to incidents
- support collaborative engagement between the sector and the UK's financial authorities (see below)
- be able to engage with frameworks in other jurisdictions, if required
The UK's three financial authorities are the Bank (including the PRA), the FCA and the Treasury.
If disruptions have the potential to impact the whole sector, these authorities act together. The Authorities Response Framework co-ordinates their response.