ENF 15

Prosecution
of criminal offences

ENF 15.1

Application and purpose

Application

ENF 15.1.1

See Notes

handbook-guidance
This chapter applies to all firms and individuals employed by firms, approved persons, appointed representatives, and any other persons who may be involved in committing criminal offences that the FSA has power to prosecute under the Act.

Purpose

ENF 15.1.2

See Notes

handbook-guidance
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the FSA's powers to prosecute criminal offences under sections 401 of the Act (Proceedings for Offences) and 402 of the Act (Power of the FSA to institute proceedings for certain other offences), and to provide guidance on how the FSA intends to exercise these powers.

ENF 15.2

Introduction

ENF 15.2.1

See Notes

handbook-guidance
Under section 401 of the Act (Proceedings for Offences), the FSA has power to prosecute the following offences:
(1) carrying on or purporting to carry on a regulated activity without authorisation or exemption (under section 23);
(2) making false claims to be authorised or exempt (under section 24);
(3) communicating an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity in breach of the restrictions on financial promotion (under section 25);
(4) misleading the FSA and other contraventions in relation to the exercise of Treaty rights (under paragraph 6 of Schedule 4);
(5) performing or agreeing to perform functions in breach of a prohibition order (under section 56(4));
(6) failing to register a copy of listing particulars on or before publication (under section 83(3));
(7) offering new securities to the public before publishing a prospectus required by the listing rules made under section 84 of the Act (section 85(2));
(8) issuing an advertisement, or other information specified in the listing rules, without prior approval or authorisation from the competent authority (under section 98(2));
(9) failing to cooperate with, or giving false information to, FSA appointed investigators (under section 177);
(10) failing to comply with provisions about control over authorised persons (under section 191);
(11) carrying on, or purporting to carry on, business in contravention of a consumer credit prohibition (under section 203(9));
(12) making false claims to be a person to whom the general prohibition does not apply as a result of Part XX of the Act (Provision of Financial Services by Members of the Professions) (under section 333);
(13) providing false or misleading information to an auditor or actuary (under section 346);
(14) disclosing confidential information in contravention of the statutory restrictions under sections 348 and 350(5) (see section 352);
(15) failure by a director of an insurer carrying on long-term insurance business to notify the FSA of a general meeting to propose a resolution for voluntary winding up (under section 366(3));
(16) Misleading statements and practices offences (under section 397);
(17) Misleading the FSA (under section 398).

ENF 15.2.2

See Notes

handbook-guidance
Under section 402 of the Act (Power of the FSA to institute proceedings for certain other offences), the FSA has power to prosecute the following offences:
(1) insider dealing under Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (under section 402(1)(a));
(2) Breaches of the prescribed regulations relating to money laundering (under section 402(1)(b)).

ENF 15.2.3

See Notes

handbook-guidance
The FSA has power to prosecute these offences in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, but not in Scotland. In Scotland, the Crown Office will remain responsible for prosecutions.

ENF 15.3

The FSA's power to prosecute criminal offences

ENF 15.3.1

See Notes

handbook-guidance
The FSA's power to prosecute criminal offences is set out in sections 401 (of the Act (Proceedings for Offences) and 402 (Power to prohibit the carrying on of Consumer Credit Act business) of the Act.

ENF 15.3.2

See Notes

handbook-guidance
Under section 401 of the Act:
(1) proceedings for an offence under the Act, or subordinate legislation made under the Act, may be instituted in England and Wales only:
(a) by the FSA or the Secretary of State; or
(b) by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions;
(2) proceedings for an offence under the Act, or subordinate legislation made under the Act, may be instituted in Northern Ireland only:
(a) by the FSA or the Secretary of State; or
(b) by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland; and
(3) except in Scotland, proceedings for an offence under section 203 (Power to prohibit the carrying on of Consumer Credit Act business) may also be instituted by the Director General of Fair Trading.

ENF 15.3.3

See Notes

handbook-guidance
Under section 402 of the Act the FSA may, except in Scotland, institute proceedings for an offence under:
(1) Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (Insider dealing); and
(2) Prescribed regulations relating to money laundering.

ENF 15.3.4

See Notes

handbook-guidance
The FSA does not have power to prosecute the offences referred to in ENF 15.3.2 G and ENF 15.3.3 G in Scotland. Public prosecution of these offences in Scotland is the responsibility of the Crown Office.

ENF 15.4

The FSA's general approach

ENF 15.4.1

See Notes

handbook-guidance
The FSA's general policy is to pursue through the criminal justice system all those cases where criminal prosecution is appropriate. The principles the FSA will apply when it decides whether a case is appropriate for criminal prosecution are set out in ENF 15.5. When considering whether to prosecute a breach of the prescribed regulations in relation to money launderingENF 15.2.2 G (2)) the FSA will also have regard to whether the person concerned has complied with the (Guidance Notes for the Financial Sector) produced by the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group.

ENF 15.4.2

See Notes

handbook-guidance
In relation to misleading statements and practices offences and insider dealing, where the FSA also has power to impose a sanction for market abuse, it will decide whether to commence criminal proceedings or impose a sanction after considering the factors set out in ENF 15.5 and ENF 15.7.2 G.

ENF 15.4.3

See Notes

handbook-guidance
In cases where criminal proceedings have commenced or will be commenced, the FSA may consider whether also to take civil or regulatory action. That action might include:
(1) injunctions (the FSA's policy and procedure in relation to the exercise of its powers to obtain injunctions against persons, whether authorised or not, is set out in ENF 6);
(2) restitution (the FSA's policy and procedure in relation to the exercise of its power to obtain restitution against persons, whether authorised or not, is set out in ENF 9);
(3) own-initiative action (the FSA's policy and procedure in relation to the exercise of its own-initiative powers in relation to firms is set out in ENF 3);
(4) withdrawal of approval or cancellation of permission and withdrawal of authorisation (the FSA's policy and procedure in relation to its power to withdraw approval from approved persons is set out inENF 7 and its policy and procedure in relation to its power to cancel a firm'spermission and withdraw authorisation is set out in ENF 5);
(5) prohibition of individuals from carrying out functions in connection with regulated activities (the FSA's policy and procedure in relation to its powers to make prohibition orders against individuals, whether authorised or not, is set out in ENF 8). The commencement of criminal proceedings against an individual (particularly where that individual is an approved person) will raise concerns in relation to that individual's fitness and propriety to perform functions in relation to regulated activities. The FSA may therefore consider making a prohibition order against him if proceedings result in a criminal conviction.

ENF 15.4.4

See Notes

handbook-guidance
When it decides whether to take any of the civil or regulatory actions set out in ENF 15.4.3 G, where criminal proceedings are in contemplation, the FSA will have regard to the following factors:
(1) whether, in the FSA's opinion, the taking of civil or regulatory action might unfairly prejudice the prosecution, or proposed prosecution, of criminal offences;
(2) whether, in the FSA's opinion, the taking of civil or regulatory action might unfairly prejudice the defendants in the criminal proceedings in the conduct of their defence; and
(3) whether it is appropriate to take civil or regulatory action, having regard to the scope of the criminal proceedings and the powers available to the criminal courts.

ENF 15.5

The Code for Crown Prosecutors

ENF 15.5.1

See Notes

handbook-guidance
When the FSA decides whether to bring criminal proceedings in England, Wales or Northern Ireland, or to refer the matter to another prosecuting authority in England, Wales or Northern Ireland (see ENF 15.8.1 G), it will apply the basic principles set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors. The November 2004 edition of the Code is set out in ENF 15 Annex 1 G.

ENF 15.5.2

See Notes

handbook-guidance
Under the Code for Crown Prosecutors, the FSA will in each case apply the Full Code Test (see paragraph 5.1 of ENF 15 Annex 1 GG) whether:
(1) there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction against the defendant on each criminal charge ('the evidential test'); and
(2) having regard to the seriousness of the offence and all the circumstances, criminal prosecution is in the public interest ('the public interest test').

The evidential test

ENF 15.5.3

See Notes

handbook-guidance
The FSA will apply the evidential test in accordance with the guidance contained in the Code for Crown Prosecutors (see paragraphs 5.2 to 5.5 of ENF 15 Annex 1 G G). In particular, the FSA will commence proceedings only where it is satisfied that the evidence is such that a jury or a bench of magistrates (properly directed in accordance with the law) is more likely than not to convict the defendant of the charge alleged.

ENF 15.5.4

See Notes

handbook-guidance
In deciding whether there is enough evidence to prosecute, the FSA will consider whether the evidence can be used in criminal proceedings and is reliable. The FSA will not generally be able to use, or refer to, in criminal proceedings a statement made by the defendant in compliance with the FSA's compulsory powers of investigation. The FSA will only be able to use those statements where the alleged offence is either making false statements otherwise than on oath, or providing false or misleading evidence to the FSA's investigators (see section 177(4) of the Act (Offences)).

The public interest test

ENF 15.5.5

See Notes

handbook-guidance
In each case where the evidential test is satisfied, the FSA will consider whether a prosecution would be in the public interest. This will depend on the circumstances of each individual case. The FSA will balance the factors for and against prosecution, and apply the guidelines set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors. Only if the FSA determines that criminal prosecution is in the public interest (see paragraphs 5.6 to 5.13 of ENF 15 Annex 1 G G) will it proceed to prosecute.

ENF 15.6

FSA cautions

ENF 15.6.1

See Notes

handbook-guidance
In some cases, the FSA may decide to issue a formal caution rather than to prosecute an offender. In these cases the FSA will follow the Home Office Guidance on the cautioning of offenders, currently contained in the Home Office Circular 18/1994. The FSA will not administer a caution unless it is satisfied that the following conditions are met:
(1) there is sufficient evidence of the offender's guilt to give a realistic prospect of conviction;
(2) the offender admits the offence; and
(3) the offender understands the significance of a caution and gives informed consent to being cautioned.

ENF 15.6.2

See Notes

handbook-guidance
Where the FSA decides to administer a formal caution, a record of the caution will be kept by the FSA, but the FSA will not publish the caution. The issue of a caution may influence the FSA in its decision whether or not to prosecute the offender if he offends again. If the offender is a firm or an approved person, a caution given by the FSA will form part of the firm's or approved person's regulatory record for the purposes of ENF 11.4.1 G (3). If relevant, the FSA will take the caution into account in deciding whether to take disciplinary action for subsequent regulatory misconduct by the firm or the approved person. The FSA may also take a caution into account when considering a person's honesty, integrity and reputation and his fitness or propriety to perform controlled or other functions in relation to regulated activities (see FIT 2.1.3 G).

ENF 15.7

Criminal prosecutions in cases of market abuse

ENF 15.7.1

See Notes

handbook-guidance
The FSA's power to impose sanctions for market abuse is intended to complement the existing criminal regime for insider dealing and misleading statements and practices offences. In some cases there will be instances of market misconduct that may arguably involve a breach of the criminal law as well as market abuse as defined in the Act. When the FSA decides whether to commence criminal proceedings rather than impose a sanction in relation to that misconduct, it will take into account those factors set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors referred to in ENF 15.5. When deciding whether to prosecute market misconduct which also falls within the definition of market abuse, application of the tests set out in ENF 15.5 may involve consideration of some of the factors set out in ENF 15.7.2 G.

ENF 15.7.2

See Notes

handbook-guidance

The factors which the FSA may consider when deciding whether to commence a criminal prosecution for market misconduct rather than impose a sanction for market abuse include, but are not limited to, the following:

  1. (1) the seriousness of the misconduct: if the misconduct is serious and prosecution is likely to result in a significant sentence, criminal prosecution may be appropriate;
  2. (2) whether there are victims who have suffered loss as a result of the misconduct: where there are no victims a criminal prosecution is less likely to be appropriate;
  3. (3) the extent and nature of the loss suffered: where the misconduct has resulted in substantial loss and/or loss has been suffered by a substantial number of victims, criminal prosecution may be appropriate;
  4. (4) the effect of the misconduct on the market: where the misconduct has resulted in significant distortion or disruption to the market and/or has significantly damaged market confidence, a criminal prosecution may be appropriate;
  5. (5) the extent of any profits accrued or loss avoided as a result of the misconduct: where substantial profits have accrued or loss avoided as a result of the misconduct, criminal prosecution may be appropriate;
  6. (6) whether there are grounds for believing that the misconduct is likely to be continued or repeated: if it appears that the misconduct may be continued or repeated and the imposition of a financial penalty is unlikely to deter further misconduct, a criminal prosecution may be more appropriate than a financial penalty;
  7. (7) whether the person has previously been cautioned or convicted in relation to market misconduct or has been subject to civil or regulatory action in respect of market misconduct: where this is the case, a criminal prosecution may be appropriate;
  8. (8) the extent to which redress has been provided to those who have suffered loss as a result of the misconduct and/or whether steps have been taken to remedy any failures in systems or controls which gave rise to the misconduct: where such steps are taken promptly and voluntarily, criminal prosecution may not be appropriate; however, potential defendants will not avoid prosecution simply because they are able to pay compensation;
  9. (9) the effect that a criminal prosecution may have on the prospects of securing redress for those who have suffered loss: where a criminal prosecution will have adverse effects on the solvency of a firm or individual in circumstances where loss has been suffered by consumers, the FSA may decide that criminal proceedings are not appropriate;
  10. (10) whether the person is being or has been voluntarily cooperative with the FSA in taking corrective measures; however, potential defendants will not avoid prosecution merely by fulfilling a statutory duty to take those measures;
  11. (11) where an individual's misconduct involves dishonesty or an abuse of a position of authority or trust: in these circumstances, criminal prosecution may be appropriate;
  12. (12) where the misconduct in question was carried out by a group, and a particular individual has played a leading role in the commission of the misconduct: in these circumstances criminal proceedings may be appropriate in relation to that individual;
  13. (13) the personal circumstances of an individual may be relevant to a decision whether to commence a criminal prosecution.

ENF 15.7.3

See Notes

handbook-guidance
The importance attached by the FSA to these factors will vary from case to case and the factors are not necessarily cumulative or exhaustive.

ENF 15.7.4

See Notes

handbook-guidance
It is the FSA's policy not to impose a sanction for market abuse where a person is being prosecuted for market misconduct or has been finally convicted or acquitted of market misconduct (following the exhaustion of all appeal processes) in a criminal prosecution arising from substantially the same allegations. Similarly, it is the FSA's policy not to commence a prosecution for market misconduct where the FSA has brought or is seeking to bring disciplinary proceedings for market abuse arising from substantially the same allegations.

ENF 15.7.5

See Notes

handbook-guidance

Where the FSA decides to commence criminal proceedings for market misconduct or imposes a sanction for market abuse, it may also consider taking civil or regulatory action. That action may include:

  1. (1) applying to court for an injunction to prevent market abuse continuing or to require the person to take steps to remedy the consequences of the abuse (see ENF 6.4);
  2. (2) applying to court for an order for restitution (see ENF 9.4) or exercising its administrative power to require restitution (see ENF 9.5) in relation to profits accrued by the person or loss suffered by others as a result of the abuse.
  3. (3) withdrawal of approval (see ENF 7) or cancellation of permission and withdrawal of authorisation (see ENF 5).
  4. (4) prohibition of individuals from carrying out functions in connection with regulated activities (see ENF 8).

ENF 15.7.6

See Notes

handbook-guidance
The FSA does not have power to prosecute offences of market misconduct in Scotland. These proceedings will remain the responsibility of the Crown Office.

ENF 15.8

Liaison with other prosecuting authorities

ENF 15.8.1

See Notes

handbook-guidance
The FSA has power to prosecute offences under the Act in England or Wales and in Northern Ireland. In addition the following authorities also have that power:
(1) in England and Wales: the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, the Director General of Fair Trading (in relation to offences involving the Consumer Credit Act), the Crown Prosecution Service and, in cases of serious or complex fraud, the Serious Fraud Office;
(2) in Northern Ireland: the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, the Director of Public Prosecutions in Northern Ireland, and in cases of serious or complex fraud, the Serious Fraud Office.

ENF 15.8.2

See Notes

handbook-guidance
The FSA has no power to prosecute offences under the Act in Scotland where prosecution will remain the responsibility of the Crown Office.

ENF 15.8.3

See Notes

handbook-guidance
The FSA has agreed guidelines that will establish a framework for liaison and cooperation in cases where one or more of these authorities has an interest in prosecuting any aspect of a matter that the FSA is considering for investigation, investigating or considering prosecuting. These Guidelines are set out in ENF 2 Annex 1 G G.

ENF 15 Annex 1

Code for Crown prosecutors

See Notes

handbook-guidance
Code for Crown prosecutors
The November 2004 edition of the code is reproduced below by kind permission of the Crown Prosecution Service.